Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir by Hussain, Syed Rifaat
7reach Rawalpindi via Muzaffarabad faster than they 
could reach New Delhi. 
So far the cross-LoC interactions have been nar-
rowly based in addressing the interests of only one 
region—the Kashmir Valley. The regions of Jammu 
and Ladakh have been largely ignored. There are 
numerous divided families in the Kargil region, who 
have relatives across the LoC in Skardu and Gilgit 
and also in the Jammu region. India should take 
active measures to open Kargil-Skardu and Jammu-
Sialkot roads for the movement of divided families. 
There is a need to expand the interactions along the 
LoC and this enlargement should address all five 
regions—Jammu, Muzaffarabad, Kashmir Valley, 
Northern Areas and Ladakh.
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Historically, Pakistan has viewed its dispute with 
India over Kashmir as the key determinant of its stra-
tegic behavior in the international arena. Advocacy of 
the rights of the Kashmiri people to freely determine 
their future has been the main plank of Islamabad’s 
diplomatic strategy in the United Nations and other 
international fora. By championing the cause of the 
rights of the Kashmiri people, Islamabad has tried to 
remind the world that India’s control over two-thirds 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is not only legally 
untenable but morally unjust, as it was achieved 
through an instrument of accession with a ruler who 
had lost the support of the vast majority of his pre-
dominantly Muslim subjects. Pakistan’s official stance 
on Kashmir can be summarized into the following six 
interrelated propositions:
1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed 
territory.
2. This disputed status is acknowledged in the UN 
Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 
and January 5, 1949, to which both Pakistan and 
India are a party.
3. These resolutions remain operative and cannot be 
unilaterally disregarded by either party.
4. Talks between India and Pakistan over the future 
status of Jammu and Kashmir should aim to 
secure the right of self-determination for the 
Kashmiri people. This right entails a free, fair and 
internationally supervised plebiscite as agreed in 
the UN Security Council resolutions.
5. The plebiscite should offer the people of Jammu 
and Kashmir the choice of permanent accession to 
either Pakistan or India.
6. Talks between India and Pakistan, in regard to the 
future status of Jammu and Kashmir, should be 
held in conformity both with the Simla Agree-
ment of July 1972 and the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions. An international mediatory 
role in such talks may be appropriate if mutually 
agreed.
This stated Pakistani position on Kashmir has 
undergone a fundamental shift under President 
General Pervez Musharraf who, after assuming power 
in October 1999 in a bloodless coup, has been, in his 
own words, “pondering outside the box” solutions 
to resolve the dispute. This paper examines various 
aspects of the changing Pakistani outlook on Kashmir 
and analyzes different factors underpinning this 
change. 
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Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has alternated between 
force and diplomacy, with the former remaining the 
dominant instrument until very recently. having 
unsuccessfully tried wars in 1947-1948 and 1965, 
different forms of sub-conventional warfare in the 
1980s and the 1990s, and limited war in Kargil in 
1999 as instruments of its Kashmir policy to change 
the territorial status quo in its favor, Islamabad 
revived its quest for a diplomatic solution under Pres-
ident Musharraf. In summer 2001, two years after 
the Kargil conflict, which nearly provoked a full-scale 
India-Pakistan war, President Musharraf proposed a 
“reciprocal action plan” to New Delhi as a first step to 
defuse tensions between them and to promote peace. 
While calling upon India to stop atrocities in Indian-
held Kashmir, it said “Pakistan might recommend 
to the freedom fighters to moderate their indigenous 
freedom struggle in Kashmir.” 
During his summit meeting with Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Agra on July 14–16, 
2001, President Musharraf reassured his Indian host 
that he had come to meet him “with an open mind.” 
he also underscored his desire to have “discussions 
with Indian leaders on establishing tension free and 
cooperative relations between our two countries.” 
The Agra Summit failed to produce a tangible 
outcome, but the draft Agra Declaration that both 
sides considered issuing at the end of their historic 
meeting clearly stated that “settlement of the Jammu 
and Kashmir issue would pave the way for nor-
malization of relations between the two countries.” 
President Musharraf outlined his four-point approach 
to resolving the Kashmir dispute during his breakfast 
meeting with representatives of electronic and print 
media held in Agra on July 16, 2001. Responding 
to a question on how best to resolve the Kashmir 
dispute, President Musharraf said: “Step one was the 
initiation of dialogue…acceptance of Kashmir as the 
main issue was step two…negating certain solutions 
unacceptable to both sides was step three…exploring 
remaining options was step four.” 
In a remarkable reversal of Islamabad’s verbal 
strategy on Kashmir, President Musharraf publicly 
stated on December 17, 2003 that even though “we 
are for United Nations Security resolutions … now 
we have left that aside.” A month later, in a joint 
statement issued in Islamabad, following his meeting 
with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee on January 6, 
2004, Musharraf categorically pledged that he would 
not “permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to 
be used to support terrorism in any manner.” This 
statement was meant to mollify New Delhi’s concerns 
relating to the issue of alleged “cross-border” infiltra-
tion from Pakistan.
By dropping the longstanding demand for a 
UN-mandated plebiscite over divided Kashmir, and 
by assuring New Delhi that Islamabad would not 
encourage violent activity in Indian-held Kashmir, 
President Musharraf tried to create much-needed 
political space for New Delhi to substantively engage 
itself with Islamabad for finding a workable solution 
to the festering Kashmir dispute.
President Musharraf reiterated his four-point pro-
posal for resolving the Kashmir dispute while address-
ing a closed door symposium organized by the India 
Today Conclave 2004 via satellite from Islamabad on 
March 13, 2004. According to him: 
1.  The centrality of the Kashmir dispute should be 
accepted by India and Pakistan. 
2.  Talks should commence to resolve the dispute. 
3.  All solutions not acceptable to any of the three 
parties are to be taken off the table. 
4.  The most feasible and acceptable option should be 
chosen.
A few months later, while talking to a group of 
newspaper editors at an Iftar dinner in Islamabad on 
October 25, 2004, President Musharraf called for 
a national debate on new options for the Kashmir 
dispute. The necessity for this debate stemmed from 
the fact that demands for conversion of the Line of 
Control (LoC) into an international border and a 
plebiscite were not acceptable to Pakistan and India 
respectively. To break the deadlock he suggested 
that identification of various zones of the disputed 
territory needs to be carried out followed by their 
demilitarization and a determination of their status. 
he identified seven regions in Jammu and Kashmir 
based on “religious, ethnic and geographical terms” 
for this purpose. 
Two regions—Azad Kashmir and Northern 
areas—are under the control of Pakistan, whereas 
five regions are under Indian control. The first part 
comprises Jammu, Sambha and Katwa where hindus 
are in majority. The second part also comprises 
Jammu but the areas include Dodha, Phirkuch and 
Rajawri where a Muslim population is in majority, 
which includes Gujars, Sudhans and Rajas who are 
also associated with Azad Kashmir. The third part is 
the area of Kashmir Valley, which also has Muslim 
majority. The fourth part is Kargil, which has Shia 
and Balti populations in majority, and the fifth area 
is Ladakh and adjoining areas where Buddhists live. 
President Musharraf further said that it was impera-
tive that the linguistic, ethnic, religious, geographic, 
political and other aspects of these seven regions 
should be reviewed and a peaceful solution to the 
problem found.
Speaking at a conference organized by Pugwash 
in March 2006, President Musharraf renewed his call 
for demilitarization, asserting 
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9[his country’s] proposals for demilitarisation 
and self-governance offered a practical solution 
to the Kashmir dispute. An ultimate solution 
to the problem on these lines would make the 
LoC irrelevant. And such a solution would 
neither require redrawing of borders, nor make 
Line of Control irrelevant. The demilitarisa-
tion would be a great confidence-building 
measure and provide relief to Kashmir. This 
will also help discourage militancy.
In an interview given to CNN-IBN news channel 
in January 2007, President Musharraf proposed joint 
management by India and Pakistan of the disputed 
region of Jammu and Kashmir. That arrange-
ment would leave India and Pakistan with reduced 
sovereignty over the territories, which they presently 
control in Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf further 
said in that interview that 
[he did] not agree with India’s claim that 
there already was self-governance in the held 
Kashmir, and claimed that most of the people 
there do not accept the Indian government. If 
India believed there was self-governance, we 
keep sticking to this position, we will never 
move forward because we do not agree. There-
fore, if you want to move forward, we have to 
leave stated position.
In his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, Presi-
dent Musharraf described his four-point proposal 
as “purely personal which needed to be sold to the 
public by all involved parties for acceptance.”
he summarized his proposal as follows:
1.  First, identify the geographic regions of Kashmir 
that need resolution. At present the Pakistani 
part is divided into two regions: Northern areas 
and Azad Kashmir. The Indian part is divided 
into three regions: Jammu, Srinagar, and Ladakh. 
Are all these on the table for discussion, or there 
are ethnic, political, and strategic considerations 
dictating some give and take.
2. Second, demilitarize the identified region or 
regions and curb all militant aspects of the 
struggle for freedom. This will give comfort to the 
Kashmiris, who are fed up with the fighting and 
killing on both sides.
3. Third, introduce self-governance or self-rule in 
the identified region or regions. Let the Kashmiris 
have the satisfaction of running their own affairs 
without having an international character and 
remaining short of independence.
4. Fourth, and most important, have a joint manage-
ment mechanism with a membership consisting 
of Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris oversee-
ing self-governance and dealing with residual 
subjects common to all identified regions and 
those subjects that are beyond the scope of self-
governance. 
Factors Driving Pakistan’s New 
Thinking on Kashmir
There are a number of factors driving Islamabad’s 
new thinking on Kashmir. First, there is a clear 
recognition of the inefficacy of war in the wake of 
Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in 1998 to resolve 
the central issue of Kashmir. In early 1999, troops 
of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry, disguised as 
Kashmiri mujahideen, crossed the LoC and occupied 
strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, 
Kargil, and Batalik sectors of Ladakh. Through this 
military incursion Islamabad sought to “block the 
Dras-Kargil highway, cut off Leh from Srinagar, trap 
the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier, raise the 
militant’s banner of revolt in the Valley and bring 
the Kashmir issue firmly back to the forefront of the 
international agenda.” Angered by Pakistan’s military 
incursion, which endangered its vital supply routes to 
Leh and the Siachen, New Delhi launched a counter 
military offensive and threatened to impose a war on 
Pakistan in order to restore the status quo. 
India also effectively mobilized world opinion 
against Pakistan. The G-8 countries held Pakistan 
responsible for the military confrontation in Kashmir 
and described the Pakistani military action to change 
the status quo as “irresponsible.” They called upon 
Islamabad to withdraw its forces north of the LoC. 
The EU publicly called for “immediate withdrawal of 
the infiltrators.” The United States also depicted Paki-
stan as the “instigator” and insisted that the status 
quo ante be unconditionally and unambiguously 
restored. Caving in to mounting international pres-
sure for withdrawal, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif made a dash to Washington on July 4, 1999 
and signed a joint statement with President Clinton, 
which called for the restoration of the “sanctity” of 
the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla 
Agreement. The Kargil War exposed the inherent 
limitations of Islamabad’s strategy of sub-conven-
tional war against India in a nuclear environment and 
forced Pakistan into negotiations to resolve the core 
issue of Kashmir. Islamabad realized that war scares 
were neither good for its image as a nuclear weapon 
state nor for its economic development and progress. 
Second, there has been sustained American pres-
sure on Islamabad to bury the hatchet with India 
over Kashmir. The Kargil War and the 2001-2002 
India-Pakistan military stand-off made Washington 
realize that without enduring peace, South Asia 
would remain a nuclear flashpoint and therefore, to 
use President Clinton’s phrase, “the most dangerous 
place on earth.” More importantly, the American 
strategic goal of peace and stability in Afghanistan 
cannot be achieved without moderating India-
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Pakistan competition over Afghanistan. Renewal 
of the India-Pakistan rivalry for influence over 
Afghanistan was deemed bad news for peace in that 
war torn country. Islamabad feels hemmed in by the 
growing Indian diplomatic and economic presence 
in its strategic rear and therefore extremely reluctant 
to let the pro-Indian, Tajik-dominated dispensation 
in Kabul gain ground. Longstanding proposals for 
building trans-Asian gas pipelines would become 
feasible only through India-Pakistan cooperation in 
Afghanistan and also would allow trade to replace 
war as the primary interaction between Afghanistan 
and its neighbors.
The third factor pushing Pakistan toward peace 
with India is the need to display responsible nuclear 
custodianship. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, 
which was waged to remove a “rogue” regime with 
potential for having weapons of mass destruction, 
Islamabad feels obligated to reassure the world 
community about its nuclear weapons and growing 
missile capabilities. Resumption of the India-Pakistan 
dialogue with its focus on nuclear risk reduction 
measures seems to be the only credible way of easing 
world concern over the safety and security of the 
Pakistani nuclear arsenal, which—after the A.Q. 
Khan episode—are being viewed by the international 
community with a great deal of apprehension.
The fourth factor underpinning Islamabad’s new 
approach to Kashmir is the “boomerang” effect 
of jihad as an instrument of Pakistan’s Kashmir 
policy. Emboldened by its pivotal role in the Afghan 
resistance movement that culminated in Moscow’s 
military defeat in 1988, Pakistan turned its attention 
toward Indian-held Kashmir where a Kashmiri “inti-
fada” broke out in 1988-89 against Indian repressive 
policies. Backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intel-
ligence (ISI), several jihadi groups prominent among 
which were the hizbul Mujahideen, the Al Badr 
Mujahideen, the harkat-ul Mujahideen (previously 
known as harkat ul Ansar), the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, 
and Jaish-e-Mohammed “found a new cause in 
Indian administered Kashmir where an insurgency 
had erupted in 1989.” Their involvement in the 
Kashmiri intifada transformed it from a domestic 
insurgency (conducted via the Jammu Kashmir Lib-
eration Front) into a low-intensity conflict between 
India and Pakistan. As Islamabad’s forward policy 
in Indian-held Kashmir began to take its toll on the 
Indian security forces and along with them those of 
the innocent civilians, New Delhi accused Pakistan of 
waging a proxy war against India from Azad Kashmir. 
Indian and foreign media reports identified at least 
91 insurgent training camps in Azad Kashmir, “the 
bulk of which lie contiguous to the Indian districts of 
Kupwara, Baramullah, Poonch, Rajuari and Jammu.” 
The jihad strategy became an untenable proposi-
tion for Islamabad after the terrorist strikes against 
the United States on September 11, 2001, followed 
by suicide attacks against the Jammu and Kashmir 
state assembly in October and the Indian parlia-
ment in December 2001. These cataclysmic events 
changed the rules of the game and led to the blurring 
of the moral distinction between freedom fight-
ers and terrorists. Under the new rules for a state’s 
responsibility for terrorist groups operating inside 
its borders, Pakistan could no longer allow jihadi 
groups to use its territory with impunity, nor could 
it completely absolve itself of the responsibility 
for the violence perpetrated by them beyond its 
borders. Between December 2001 and July 2002, 
India threatened to wage a limited conventional war 
against Pakistan unless Islamabad terminated its 
support for what New Delhi portrayed as cross-
border terrorism. Leveraging effectively its threat of 
war against Pakistan, New Delhi forced Islamabad to 
crack down on some of the fundamentalist Islamic 
groups waging war against the Indian government in 
Kashmir. Pakistan banned some of the jihadi groups 
in January 2002 and promised to permanently end 
its support for armed militancy in Kashmir provided 
New Delhi agreed to find a negotiated settlement 
of the Kashmir dispute. These moves by Pakistan’s 
government caused huge disappointment among the 
Kashmir militant groups and some radical elements 
associated with them were recruited by Al-Qaeda to 
assassinate President Musharraf in December 2003. 
With Pakistan’s pro-jihad Kashmir policy turned on 
its head, armed militant groups turned their guns and 
anger against the Musharraf regime. They assumed 
the role of “peace spoilers” by joining hands with 
the resurgent Taliban-Al-Qaeda forces operating out 
of the “lawless” borderlands along the Durand line 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
To stem the rising tide of extremist violence in 
the country, in which at least 1,896 people including 
655 civilians, 354 security forces personnel and 887 
terrorists died in 2007 alone, Islamabad intensified 
military operations against the jihadi elements in the 
tribal areas and stormed the radical Lal Masjid (Red 
Mosque) in the capital city of Islamabad in June 2007 
on the suspicion that suicide bombers linked to Al-
Qaeda had taken refuge in the mosque. More than 70 
militants died in the assault on the Red Mosque. To 
avenge the military assault on the Red Mosque and to 
protest the intensified military operations against pro-
Taliban forces in North Waziristan, armed militants 
scrapped a peace deal with the government in July 
2007. In August they captured 280 soldiers including 
a colonel and nine officers after intercepting a mili-
tary convoy in South Waziristan. In October 2007, 
armed militants ambushed an army convoy in North 
Waziristan in which 20 soldiers and 45 militants were 
killed. Over 20 soldiers of the Frontier Corps were 
captured by local Taliban militants on October 7 
after they successfully assaulted a military checkpoint 
in Spin Wam, adjacent to hangu district in troubled 
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North Waziristan. Reacting to these developments, 
President Musharraf told Dawn News TV that the 
prevailing conditions in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) were “extremely precarious” and 
described the threat from religious extremism as the 
primary security challenge facing the country.
Pakistan’s domestic politics took yet another 
violent turn on October 16, 2007 when over 136 
people died and 500 were injured in Karachi, in a 
suicide bombing attack on the homecoming public 
procession of former Prime Minister Benazir’s 
Bhutto’s return to Pakistan. Militant elements linked 
to pro-Taliban warlord Baitullah Mehsud were widely 
believed to be behind this atrocity. In his condolence 
call to Benazir, President Musharraf expressed his 
deepest sorrow over the terrorist attack and vowed to 
arrest the culprits. This rising tide of terrorist violence 
within Pakistan has forced Islamabad to rethink 
its relationship with militant religious groups. The 
Kashmir jihad is now being viewed as a double-edged 
sword with Islamabad holding the sharper end of it 
due to its devastating “blowback” effect.
Domestic Reactions to Pakistan’s 
Shifting Kashmir Policy
President Musharraf ’s new thinking on Kashmir has 
evoked a mixed reaction at home. The religious right, 
led by Jamaat-e-Islami, has vociferously opposed his 
decision to ban the jihadi outfits and questioned 
the wisdom of his moves to seek a settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute outside the framework of the UN 
Security Council resolutions. Islamists have debunked 
the ongoing peace process as a “one man show” and 
have rejected Musharraf ’s proposals as a “U-turn,” 
and a “roll-back” of Pakistan’s principled position 
on Kashmir. They have decried summit meetings 
between President Musharraf and Indian leaders as 
a “national humiliation.” Supporters of the Pakistan 
Muslim League (Nawaz Group) have also accused 
President Musharraf of taking a U-turn on the 
Kashmir issue and neglecting the people of Kashmir 
in his efforts to normalize relations with India. 
The Pakistan People’s Party formerly led by the late 
Benazir Bhutto, while supporting President Mushar-
raf ’s efforts to seek a rapprochement with India, had 
demanded greater transparency about discussions 
being conducted through the back-channel links 
between Islamabad and New Delhi. Significantly, on 
the eve of her return to Pakistan after eight years of 
self-imposed exile abroad, Bhutto publicly stated that 
if voted into power in the January 2008 elections, 
her party would continue the dialogue process with 
India. Prominent Azad Kashmiri leaders includ-
ing former President and Prime Minister of Azad 
Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Qayyum, have also endorsed 
President Musharraf ’s general stance that there is no 
scope for militancy in their freedom struggle and a 
solution is only possible through negotiations and 
peaceful means.
It is worth noting here that the India-Pakistan 
peace process, contrary to prevalent public per-
ceptions of slow progress, seems to have made 
considerable progress in back-channel discussions 
between Islamabad and New Delhi. This progress 
led Pakistan’s foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmood 
Kasuri, to claim in April 2007 that both countries 
were extremely close to reaching a settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute. Media reports indicated that both 
sides had reached a broad agreement on five elements 
of this settlement. The agreed points are: 
1. No change in the territorial layout of Kashmir 
currently divided into Pakistani and Indian areas; 
2. Creation of a soft border across the LoC; 
3. Greater autonomy and self-governance within 
Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the state; 
4. A cross-LoC consultative mechanism; and finally,
5. Demilitarization of Kashmir at a pace determined 
by the decline in cross border terrorism. 
how this emerging consensus will get sold by 
Islamabad and New Delhi to their respective wary 
publics, determined peace spoilers, and vested 
interests associated with entrenched positions would 
largely depend on the vagaries of domestic politics 
in each country, which at the time of this writing is 
looking increasingly uncertain and fluid.
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